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Department of Philosophy, University of Tartu
is paper is a reply to commentaries onMind Ascribed. My response is organised
into three parts. In the rst part I describe the relationship between folk psychol-
ogy and the scientic study of the mind. e second part replies to objections to
the central tenets and presuppositions of the ascription theory. I clarify the dis-
tinction between the nature and the possession of mental states and the notion of a
pleonastic entity. I explain why the ascription theory is a version of interpretivism,
and not a species of instrumentalism or ctionalism. I also argue that canonical
ascription should not be spelled out in terms of the ideal interpreter.e third part
deals with comments on miscellaneous topics such as normativity, self-knowledge,
the necessity of the brain and the proper understanding of intentional patterns.
Keywords: interpretivism, mental states, folk psychology, self-knowledge, natural
kinds, normativity
Reading such sympathetic contributions has been an immensely rewarding
experience. I am very grateful to Daniel Cohnitz for creating the opportu-
nity for this book symposium and to the symposiasts for their insightful and
thought-provoking comments. ey have made me think hard about the
foundational issues of my (somewhat unimaginatively named) ascription
theory. In some cases, the objections or comments were due to misunder-
standings invited by ambiguities and vagueness on my part, and those were
relatively easy to rectify. In other cases, they reected our disagreements
over deeper philosophical questions. As it happens, each commentator con-
centrated on a dierent set of issues and there were relatively few recurrent
concerns, if any. I can nonetheless group my replies into three parts. e
rst is concerned with broader questions about the relationship between the
folk psychological and the scientic conceptions of the mind. e second
is dedicated to the ascription theory itself, focussing on its central notions
and presuppositions. e third part is more heterogeneous. It includes my
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responses on the remaining topics such as normativity and self-knowledge
among others.
Despite the fact that quite some time has passed since the book’s pub-
lication, I have not changed my fundamental outlook. However, hopefully
I now have a somewhat clearer view of those issues that were still hazy for
me at the time of writing the book. So in this reply I am not going to revise
the basics of the ascription theory, but I oer rejoinders that restate, repair,
reinforce, rehabilitate and hopefully reinstate the approach, thus making in
eect the mind re-ascribed.
1. e ascribed mind and the sciences of the mind
Mind Ascribed propounded interpretivism concerning mental states as con-
ceived through folk psychology, our common-sense framework by means
of which we make sense of each other’s actions. It is then only natural that
one wonders how this common-sense conception of the mind is related to
various models of the mind and the mind’s neural basis as construed in var-
ious cognitive and neural sciences. Before we get to the ascription theory
itself, I elucidate my stance on this relationship by replying to comments
and criticism by Dominic Murphy and Sören Häggqvist. For the most part,
I comment on the idea of natural kind-hood, examine if the danger of iso-
lationism is engendered in such an understanding of the mind, and explain
why I do not nd eliminativism compelling aer all.
1.1 Mental kinds and natural kinds
One way to spell out the close link between our common-sense concep-
tion of the mind and mental kinds is to say that mastering folk psychol-
ogy amounts to grasping the nature of mental kinds. is means that their
nature does not go further than what is contained in folk psychological con-
cepts. We can nd out about concepts by a posteriori means too (for exam-
ple, by running empirical studies to nd out how various communities use
the terms), but there is no room for empirical discovery as there is in the
natural sciences or in studies of the brain. Investigations of this latter sort
may well unearth new data that shows that we need to discard our old con-
ceptions completely. e mind, however, has not the hidden resources that
give rise to such surprises. Or so I think. e same point can be expressed
in other words as the claim that mental states are not natural kinds. In this
regard, Daniel Dennett draws a vivid analogy between folk psychological
mental concepts and the concept of dust:
Suppose Twin Earth is just like Earth except for having shmust where
wehave dust—behind the books on the bookcase, along country roads
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during dry spells, etc. But surely, you protest, the concept of dust isn’t
the concept of a natural kind—shmust is dust, in spite of what any-
body says! Exactly. It is a supercial concept, a nominal essence of
scant interest or power. We already know enough about dust to know
that science couldn’t discover that dust was really something else—or
that there wasn’t any dust. Science could not uncover the secret na-
ture of dust, because dust qua dust couldn’t have a secret nature. In
contrast, we already know enough about water, and gold, to know that
they are natural kinds. . . . are the concepts of folk psychology like the
concept of dust, or like the concept of water? . . . I think we already
know enough about many of them to know that even though they
may aspire to name natural kinds (unlike the concept of dust), they
aren’t good enough to succeed. (Dennett 1994, 535–536)
Just as there can be no discoveries about the real hidden nature of dust,
there can be no scientic discoveries about the real hidden natures ofmental
kinds. Mental kinds are folk kinds: an outcome of the ways the folk carve
the world, something that is not xed by nature itself. is explains what
is special about the mental-physical relationship, as compared with analo-
gous relationships (e.g. biology-physics, geography-physics etc.) for kinds
(e.g. biological kinds, geographical kinds etc.) besides the mental, which
are studied in the special sciences. In order to locate mental entities in the
natural world, an interpretivist solution becomes apt, especially if traditional
reductionism is found inadequate and wholesale eliminativism is not a good
option.
In the book I rejected the idea that mental states are natural kinds by
drawing on Brian Ellis’ (2001) conception of natural kinds. Arguably, and as
alluded to by Häggqvist, given this conception, the criteria for natural kind-
hood are very dicult to meet. So perhaps on some more relaxed version,
mental states would come out as natural kinds aer all?ose more relaxed
versions would require merely the groupings of similar features that are the
result of common causal mechanisms and that ground success in explana-
tion and inductive reasoning (e.g. Quine 1969; Boyd 1991). Of course, the
verdict would also depend on the acceptability of these accounts of natural
kinds themselves. Perhaps they are too lenient. But here is not the right place
for a detailed study of dierent theories of natural kinds. I would only like
to note that if folk psychological generalisations support counterfactuals, are
inductively successful and are explanatory, then ultimately this success is due
to the causally ecacious entities that undergird mentalistic explanations.
ose could well be natural kinds, if they full the right criteria, but this
does not bestow natural kind status upon mental states. For the projectabil-
ity of mental terms is not then due to their status as mental, but rather to the
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corresponding subpersonal goings-on. Moreover, as I argued in the book1
(230–231), the relation between the successful mentalistic explanation and
the subpersonal causally ecacious basis is very loose. It could well happen
that on the neural level, several kinds correspond to what the folk consider
to be a unitary mental kind.
While we are on the topic of natural kinds, let me also clarify one minor
issue about how to read a passage from Dennett (1994, 536) that I quoted in
144. Häggqvist (2017, 9) claims that I have overlooked a “natural reading”
of Dennett’s quote on which he rejects the very notion of a natural kind.
However, such a reading is not plausible if one looks at the wider context
from which it was taken. ere Dennett argues for “supercialism” about
folk concepts, a view on which there are no deeper, scientically discover-
able facts of the matter on whether these concepts apply in a particular case
or not. He does acknowledge that there are natural kinds (see also the quote
above)—these being the cases when our terms happen to carve nature at its
joints like “water” or “gold”—but warns against extending this idea to all
cases (Dennett 1994, 535). His argument about nested natural kinds, which I
quoted in the book, is a kind of reductio of the “hysterical realist’s” insistence
that it alwaysmakes sense to ask for the exact reference of our natural kind
terms. Sometimes this is a matter of negotiation in view of our interests,
not of discovery of the facts.at the argument concerns the word “water”,
shows that even in this case (which involves modication of Putnam’s stan-
dard Twin Earth story) there could be circumstances in which there can be
no facts about which kind the term really denotes. But one should not con-
clude from this that water is not a natural kind or that the ‘natural kind’ idea
itself is suspect.
1.2 Neither isolation nor elimination
If the nature of mental kinds does not lie deeper than what can be garnered
from the folk conception, then what about all the sciences that also purport
to study the mind? In particular, asks Dominic Murphy (2017a), could folk
psychology be revised on empirical grounds? Or is folk psychology isolated
from the scientic interventions?
I do not want to defend isolationism concerning folk psychology. I agree
with Murphy that this position is unappealing, but detailing the interplay
between folk psychology and the science requires some care. e commit-
ments of the ascription theory do not preclude a mutual interplay between
the folk psychological scheme and science. As noted, the inuence can go
in both directions.
1 All references toMind Ascribed (Mölder 2010) are by page numbers only.
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On the one hand, the folk psychological concepts are oen used in psy-
chology and neuroscience to form hypotheses or to delineate the initial ob-
ject for study. In the course of this, the original folk psychological notions
become rather strictly specied as well as operationalised, resulting in a reg-
imented vocabulary that can be more precisely linked to processes in the
brain. is possibility was already outlined in the book and I do not see it
as conicting with interpretivism (70–72). I nd myself in agreement with
Francken and Slors (2014), who point out that both common-sense con-
cepts and their scientic counterparts can be viewed as interpretations of
behaviour.ey argue that interpretation is required at all stages of such sci-
entic theorising: in deciding whether those scientic concepts apply prop-
erly to the behavioural outcomes of experimental tasks as well as in deciding
which brain areas are linked to the performance of those tasks.
What about inuence in the other direction? Given my commitment
that mental states are not natural kinds, can I allow the revision of folk psy-
chology on scientic grounds? To a certain extent, this is a live option. Folk
psychology need not be viewed as a static framework. It can be extended and
modied over time, and so can our received description of it be revised.e
ascription theory is not tied to any particular version of folk psychology. In
(Mölder 2016) I explored the idea of an extended folk psychology that would
be open to inputs from cognitive psychology and neuroscience, e.g., in the
form of such terms as ‘aordance’, ‘resonance’, etc. In the case where the new
terms are suciently strongly linked to the old folk framework they can be
regarded as part of an extended folk psychology.
Francken and Slors (2018) call attention to some ways in which the folk
psychological framework can be inuenced by cognitive neuroscience, of
which two are the most pertinent here. First, neuroscientic terminology
can go to the masses, be adopted by the people and eventually transform
their self-descriptions. As an example, theymention an addict who is able to
give an enriched phenomenological description of one’s experiences thanks
to knowing more about the underlying neural mechanisms. Second, the ap-
plication criteria of some folk concepts can be changed on scientic grounds.
eir example is responsibility: neuroscientic data can inuence the assess-
ments of responsibility in legal context. In addition, an important element
in attributing responsibility is whether one has self-control, but this depends
on various factors upon which neuroscience can throw new light. Francken
and Slors’ rst example can be viewed as a case of extending the folk frame-
work, which is not just amatter of updating the folk vocabulary, but involves
a change in people’s self-conception.e second case is an example of the in-
uence of neuroscience on the application conditions of folk psychological
terms.is is also in principle compatible with the ascription theory: in this
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case, the evidential sources for the ascription include some neuroscientic
data.
e cases in which the common-sense conception is enriched with sci-
entic input are cases of the amelioration of our concepts. A conceptual
change in the framework can be seen as a matter of the adjudication of vo-
cabulary, not as a matter of making new discoveries about the hidden nature
of mental states. To keep this consistent with the interpretivist outlook, one
should not take this to imply that the terms in the mental and the scientic
vocabulary are about the same natural kinds. Even if some neural terms do
pick out natural kinds, mental terms pick out folk kinds. e enrichment
and the extension of folk vocabulary involves thus the modication of old
folk kinds or the creation of new folk kinds. Which scenario is the case—the
modication of old or the creation of new—is ultimately a matter of policy,
that is, how important we regard the continuity with the previous ways of
speaking and how much stress we want to put on the dierences between
the old and the new (Godfrey-Smith 2004, 157; Dennett 1994, 534). But it
would not be apt to assume that this depends on uncovering new facts about
the previously hidden nature of mental kinds.
It is one thing to enlarge and improve the folk psychological vocabulary,
but revising the existing folk notions is a dierent matter.ere are limits to
the range and the extent to which such revisions are possible. One example
for such limits comes from Sehon (1997), who gives two examples of error,
which are not intelligible for us.e rst error scenario is the case in which
one does not satisfy the folk conditions for being in a certain mental state
(like desiring to watch a baseball game), but could still be attributed that
mental state on the basis of one’s brain states. e second error scenario is
the case in which one satises the folk conditions for being in a certainmen-
tal state, but could not be attributed that mental state, since there is a certain
covert property missing. e criteria for applying folk concepts cannot be
overruled by factors that are not manifested in the ordinary practice. If the
criteria used by neuroscientists are accessible only by special equipment and
are phenomenally inaccessible to people, then it is hard to see how they could
be linked to the existing folk psychological framework. But if that is the case,
then it is also hard to see how this could lead to revising our attributions.
e previously mentioned cases by Francken and Slors (2018) are dierent
as there the neural factors are either phenomenally accessible or have the
potential to enter into the folk conception via a change in our understand-
ing of what counts as, say, self-control. Without links to folk psychology,
scientic attempts to revise common-sense attributions would be perceived
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by the folk as a change of topic: they are talking about something else, not
beliefs or desires as we know them!2
By the same token, to paraphrase Dennett, there cannot be a scientic
discovery that could show that the mind was really something else or that
there are no minds. No matter what we could nd out about the physical
basis of mental processes, it cannot amount to a total rejection of the mind
as conceived by our common-sense and as reected in our everyday practice.
One can get rid of mentalistic talk only by uprooting folk psychology itself,
but this will not be a matter of discovery.
is should also explain my stance towards eliminativism. As I noted in
142, the dispute can only be over the meaning and prospects of conceptual
elimination, since both eliminativism and interpretivism do not recognise
mental entities in the ontologically strong sense. An eliminativist option
in the conceptual case looks attractive if one treats folk psychology on the
model of a scientic theory.en one can nd that it is not precise enough
to yield testable hypotheses or that its categories are not useful for a ma-
ture science.is is an attitude that eliminativism shares with realism. Both
view folk psychology as a source for scientic inquiry.ey dier in that the
realist expects that the scientic results will vindicate folk psychological clas-
sication, and the eliminativist denies this (cf. Sehon 1997, 342–343). In fact,
I am sympathetic to the idea that if one’s aim is to do good science, then one
should be prepared to leave some folk categories behind. However, I think
that folk psychology is more than just a source of concepts for the sciences,
and it can stand on its own without requiring external vindication. It is our
primary mode of making sense of ourselves and others and it is validated by
daily practice. Displacing it would be a large-scale venture that involves pro-
found change in our entire lives; it would not be just a matter of xing one
false theory (see also 146–147, Baker 1987, 130–133 or Murphy 2017b, 172). In
my view, there are therefore not just two options—if vindication fails, then
elimination is in order—and it is interpretivism that allows us to do justice
to the centrality of folk psychology in our self-conception.
2. e ascription theory: clarications and reinforcements
is part of my reply is devoted to clarications and reinforcements to the
ascription theory prompted by the objections, comments and inquiries by
Sören Häggqvist, Marc Slors and Henry Jackman. I begin by clarifying the
book’s principal distinctions between pleonastic and natural entities and be-
tween the nature and the possession of mental states. I explain my assump-
tions concerning meaning and discuss whether there is a surplus meaning
2 Cf. (Dennett 1994, 535) and (Sehon 1997, 337).
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to mental state ascriptions that turns interpretivism into instrumentalism. I
also take a stance toward pure ascriptivism as outlined byMarc Slors.en I
discuss the question of whether the notion of canonicality should be under-
stood in terms of the ideal interpreter. Finally, I explain the role of rationality
in relation to the ascription theory.
2.1 On the nature and the possession of mental states
Let me begin by recapitulating the general metaphysical framework pre-
sumed inMind Ascribed (for more details, see section 2.1 of the book). One
can talk about entities in the inationary and in the deationary sense. For
example, properties in the inationary sense are robust: they are the ways
an object really is. Properties in the deationary sense, however, include all
true predications made of an object. Speaking in the deationary sense, one
can say that there is a distinct property corresponding to each predicate.
is yields an abundance of properties, but this is harmless as long as we
do not assume such a way of speaking to carry direct commitments to fun-
damental ontology. Deationary properties are not metaphysically weighty.
e trouble arises—and this is our own making—when one takes what are
in eect only deationary entities as inationary entities. My contention
is that this may have happened with mental properties, when it is assumed
that they are properties in the same sense as physical properties. For given
such an assumption one is bound to search for a substantial account of the
relationship between inationary mental and physical properties. However,
if there are no inationary mental properties, and some physical properties
are properties also in the inationary sense, then there is no need to look for
such a substantial account.
I called entities in the deationary sense ‘pleonastic entities’. e term
comes from Schier (2003) who also outlines how one can move from us-
ing predicates to pleonastic properties. In short, whenever some predicate
applies to an object, an object has a respective pleonastic property. Besides
pleonastic properties and other entities, I assume that there are also some in-
ationary entities. Not all ontology can be easily read out from our language
use. ere is room and a need for a substantial ontology, which is couched
in terms of inationary or (as I called them) natural entities.
Häggqvist expresses somemisgivings concerning the centrality of “Schif-
ferian metaphysics” to the ascription theory, especially with regard to my
criticism of alternative accounts of the mental state possession. In fact, my
objections to alternative accounts are not and were not meant to be depen-
dent on the distinction between pleonastic and natural entities.e purpose
of my reformulations of various views on themind-body relationship was to
bring out more clearly than usual what their commitments are concerning
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what exists. It turned out that in most cases, the alternative theories of the
mental-physical relationship do not even require inationary mental prop-
erties when properly reformulated.e only exception was role functional-
ism and there I presented separate objections to the ination of role prop-
erties. But even these objections can be put in “neutral” terms. Apart from
this, my objections to the theories stemmed from their own shortcomings,
not from distinguishing inationary and deationary senses of ‘entity’.3
I do think, however, that it is useful for a proper presentation of interpre-
tivism to have some conceptual resources that do not bring along commit-
ments to inationary mental entities. Without such resources the formula-
tion of the interpretivist position would be very cumbersome or risks being
misunderstood. One way to express such an insubstantial metaphysics is to
talk in terms of pleonastic properties, but this is not the only way. See (23, fn
8) for other examples, of which it is instructive to repeat Davidson’s strategy
of using the language common with his critics:
Having banished properties, states, beliefs, and so on, from my ex-
planatorymachinery, I shall now continue to allowmyself to usewords
that supercially seem to refer to such things, on condition that I be
understood to hold that such talk can be exchanged at boring length
for talk that doesn’t use these words as referring to entities. (Davidson
2001, 299)
Another central distinction inMind Ascribed is the distinction between
the nature of an entity and the possession conditions of an entity.4e nature
of an entity is what determines what the entity is.e possession conditions
of an entity specify what it takes to have the entity. Let us consider an en-
tity such as a cat. To give an account of its nature is to give an account of
3 In addition, Häggqvist (2017, 11–12) is worried that the arguments against functional prop-
erties generalise also to non-mental functional properties thus leaving no room for func-
tional and pleonastic entities posited by the special sciences. I think that for the entities
invoked by the special sciences that are merely pleonastic, we can apply the same ascrip-
tivist story, but those entities that are not merely pleonastic need a dierent approach.e
seeds for this approach are already present in the book as I discussed a similar issue under
the problem of the drainage of causal powers to microphysics (217–218, 229).e key is to
construe non-mental macro-entities in such a way that they would have proprietary causal
powers that do not drain to the lower layers. See (Kim 2003) for an extensive discussion
of this issue.
4 A related distinction as applied to concepts (between their individuation conditions and
possession conditions) is discussed in (Fodor 1998). He criticizes “pragmatist” views such
as Peacocke’s (1992) that attempt to individuate concepts by their possession conditions and
points out that traditionally it has been taken “for granted that the explanation of concept
possession should be parasitic on the explanation of concept individuation” (Fodor 1998,
2). Note that I am not defending a particular direction of explanation. I am just arguing
that these two kinds of conditions can be distinguished, and that one need not be parasitic
on the other.
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cathood: what makes something a cat rather than something else. To ex-
plain the possession conditions of a cat is to explain what it takes to have a
cat.e nature and the possession condition can be connected with various
entailments. One possesses a cat only if what one possesses is indeed a cat.
Moreover, knowing the nature of cats helps to explain what it is to have a
cat. However, it need not follow that the account of possession conditions is
a trivial consequence of an account of the nature of an entity. Perhaps hav-
ing a cat is such a simple matter, so that having a cat is just having the thing
that cats are. But consider a more complex case such as having a house.e
possession of an immovable property such as a house involves complex so-
cial and legal facts that go beyond the straightforward specication of what
a house is.
But what if the entity under scrutiny is a pleonastic entity? Pleonastic
entities are just shadows of concepts.5 Whereas the nature of a natural entity
can go beyond our concept of that entity, there is nothing more to the na-
ture of a pleonastic entity than what is contained in our concept of the entity.
e nature of pleonastic entities is not hidden in the sense that uncovering
it requires empirical investigation of the world. All one needs to investigate
is the respective concepts. Häggqvist (2017, 10) asks why I maintain that the
nature of mental entities “lies in something as intensional as (non-mental,
public) concepts”. If this is a question about why I regard mental entities
as pleonastic, then that is a question about the very foundations of interpre-
tivism. What else could they be if they are not inationary entities? I rejected
the proposal that they are inationary entities in the book. If this is a ques-
tion about reducing themental to the non-mental, then I was not attempting
such a reduction. All I said is that to explain and to understand mental enti-
ties we need to study the way we use mental concepts.e reason for this is
that mental states are more like pieces of text that need interpretation than
they are like natural kinds such as water and gold.
Häggqvist is also puzzled about why I talk about ‘nature’ in the case of
pleonastic entities at all. I think this is quite harmless, once it is made clear
that their nature is not “deep”.ere is also a need for such a way of speaking
because the distinction between the nature and the possession conditions
holds also for pleonastic entities. If we engage in semantic ascent, this trans-
lates into a distinction between the meaning of a term and its application
conditions. A story about pleonastic entities can be told in terms of their
nature (meaning) or possession conditions (application conditions). I am
not committed to the claim that these stories must always be independent,
but I am saying that there are cases where the nature and possession condi-
5 is metaphor is used by Schier (2003, 59) who got it from Armstrong (1989, 78).
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tions can be given separate accounts such that, although linked, one is not
parasitic on the other.
is leads us to Häggqvist’s question about the connection between ap-
plication conditions of mental predicates and the nature of mental states:
why does the account of the nature of mental states not simply ow out from
an account of what it is to have them (to apply the respective predicates)?
is is denitely an option in theoretical space. For concepts, Peacocke
(1992) has developed an account that individuates concepts by the condi-
tions that a thinker has to meet in order to possess the concepts. Perhaps
something similar can be developed for mental states as well. Presumably,
the account of the nature of, say, belief would be along the following lines:
belief is just whatever it is that one has i one fulls the possession condition
for belief. In the terminology of the ascription theory, this would amount to:
belief is whatever it is that one has i it is canonically ascribable to one.
However, my view in the book was that an account of the nature of men-
tal states is independent of an account of the possession of mental states and
the ascription theory was explicitly presented as the latter. So if we are in-
terested in what it takes to have mental states, it is not enough to give the
meanings of mental terms. In turn, the meaning of mental terms (or the
nature of pleonastic mental entities) is not to be given by explaining what
it is to apply these terms. Let me rehearse the reasons why I do not think
that it is a good idea in the case of mental states to explain their nature in
terms of their possession conditions. To begin with, I do not think that the
meanings of mental terms (or any other terms, for that matter) are very am-
ple.ey are more like dictionary entries than encyclopaedia entries, to use
Ned Block’s (1995, 151) suggestive metaphor. Perhaps there is no straightfor-
ward way to measure what goes into the meaning of a word and what is le
out, but surely one constraint must be that those who use a word have some
grasp of what it means. e grasp need not be perfect and the deference to
experts in the case of some terms is possible, but for common vocabulary
(and mental terms are common) the meanings must be accessible to their
users. Now, if the meanings are lean dictionary entities, they do not incor-
porate much. In particular, they do not incorporate the clause that such and
such a mental state is ascribable. One reason for this is the “leanness” factor,
and another reason is that as far as I know, the point about interpretability
does not seem to be among the things that people grasp when they grasp
the meanings of mental terms. “Ascribability remains transparent when we
concentrate on the nature of belief ”, as I said in the book (153). Knowing the
meanings of mental terms does not entail knowledge of the ascription the-
ory or any other form of interpretivism.e third reason is that the fact that
mental states are interpretable does not individuate their nature (cf. Davies
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1995, 295–296 for a similar objection to the intentional stance theory if con-
strued as an account of concepts). Since every mental state is interpretable
according to interpretivism, and if the possession conditions were to deter-
mine the nature of mental states, then this fact about interpretability should
be part of the nature of every mental state kind (or the meaning of every
mental state term). But this does not distinguish one mental kind from any
other mental kind. It would be an idle part of the nature (and an idle part of
themeaning) of mental states, and this should raise suspicions if it is there at
all. In sum, if an interpretivist insists that interpretability enters themeaning
of mental terms, she just makes the position weaker than it should be.
All these considerations could be taken as a case against interpretivism
as such, but I think we need not go that far.ere is room for interpretivism
at the level of possession conditions, given the provision that it does not
creep into an account of the nature of mental states.e latter we can glean
from that part of ordinary language that is collected under the heading of
‘folk psychology’ (145–146).e meaning of mental state terms is presumed
when one ascribes mental states, but it does not follow that an account of
mental states cannot go beyond the account of their meanings.
However, one might wonder, why do similar considerations not also ap-
ply if we were to take possession conditions to involve interpretability; espe-
cially when I have said that, given semantic ascent, the possession conditions
of mental states just are the application conditions of mental state terms. In
particular, do people really grasp the fact about interpretability when they
apply mental terms and are there dierences in possession conditions for
dierent mental states? My answer is “Yes” for both questions. e ascrip-
tion theory aims to reect the ordinary practice of using mental vocabulary.
When we apply mental terms we do rely on the sort of evidence that I have
termed “ascription sources” and we attempt to make the dierent pieces of
information t each other. So that much, I venture to suggest, is grasped
by the folk psychologists that we are. Since to apply mental terms just is to
ascribe mental states (with contents), the ascribability must be involved too:
aer all, when we apply the terms to one, we should be able to grasp that
they are applicable to one. Of course, there is a dierence between mere
application of mental terms and the canonical ascription, just as there is a
dierence between a mere ascription and the canonical one. We can ap-
ply mental terms non-canonically. My story about canonical ascription is a
non-trivial theoretical elaboration of a standard for possession. As such one
should not expect it to be read o simply from what we know when we ap-
ply mental terms. As for the second question, I should note that the general
possession-condition scheme in 171 is indeed the same for all mental states
(with contents), but this is what one should expect from a general scheme.
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However, when the condition is considered in a particular case, that is, when
the details about the state, the content and the subject are lled in and com-
plemented with the evidence for the ascription, then it becomes as specic
as it can get. e possession conditions thus reect the specics pertain-
ing to the distinct occasions of having the same type of mental states and to
the having of distinct types of mental states, not to mention the dierences
brought along by the contents of mental states.
2.2 Instrumentalism, ctionalism, interpretivism
at I do not propound the ascription theory as an account of the meaning
of mental terms helps me to evade some of the charges Marc Slors (2017,
19–22) has directed against intermediate interpretivism. As I construed the
territory in the book, intermediate interpretivism is the middle position be-
tween pure ascriptivism—the view that the possession of mental states is
completely a matter of interpretation—and revelationism—the view that the
possession ofmental states is independent from interpretation, but the latter
can provide a good glimpse into what states one has. According to interme-
diate interpretivism (and I classied the ascription theory as falling into this
group), having mental states is not a mere subjective projection. Although
interpretability cannot be eliminated from an account of what it is to have
mental states, the ascription of mental states is answerable to objective con-
straints.
Slors argues in the following way: intermediate interpretivism leaves the
interpretivist position vulnerable to the “as if ” misconstrual. e reason
why thismisconstrual becomes possible lies in the presumption, presumably
made by intermediate interpretivism, that mental state terms have “surplus
meaning”, i.e. meaning which goes beyond our ascription practices. On the
“as if ” construal, we pretend as if we have mental states, whereas in fact or
“strictly speaking”, no one has mental states. To block the way for the “as if ”
construal, Slors suggests, the surplus meaning has to be rejected.ere is no
further meaning to mental state ascriptions beyond the one that is engen-
dered in our practices of ascription.
When Slors writes about “the meaning of mental state ascriptions” I as-
sume that what he has inmind are locutions such as ‘John believes that snow
is white’ and the mental predicates we use to make ascriptions, but not ‘I
ascribe to John the belief that snow is white’. Because the latter adds the
meaning of ‘I ascribe’ to the ascription made to John, this would have an
extra meaning compared to the rst, but this is not the issue in the present
context. As I argued above, the ascription theory makes claims about the
possession of mental states, not about their nature. erefore, it does not
add any surplus meaning to sentences such as ‘John believes that snow is
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white’. e meaning of this sentence comes entirely from the meanings of
the words that compose it. e point that the belief that snow is white is
canonically ascribable to John is a point about the proper applicability of
‘believes that snow is white’ to John, but all of this presumes the ordinary
meanings of the words.
One can distinguish the question of primacy from the question of ex-
planatory priority.e rst is a question aboutwhich comes rst into being—
meaning or use? Could mental terms have a meaning before we apply them
to each other, before we take the intentional stance? e second is a ques-
tion about what presumes what in the order of explanation. Could we rely
on the meanings of mental terms to explain how the ascription of mental
states is possible or do meaning and ascription need to be explained simul-
taneously? I do not think that meaning has primacy over use, but it does not
follow that it cannot be presumed for the project of explaining the ascriptive
use of mental terms. When we are in the position to ascribemental states we
are already deeply immersed in folk psychological practice and this practice
could not even get o the ground if with every ascription the meanings of
mental terms were to be specied from scratch.
us in my view, and in contrast to Davidson’s, the ascription of mental
states presumes that words have common meanings, and that the ascrip-
tion in itself does not add to their meanings or change them. In the book I
merely gestured towards the form that such a theory of meaning could take,
having in mind an account of the kind that explains meaning in terms of
non-mental patterns of use that are able to engender a distinction between
the correct and incorrect use of the terms. Now, Slors (2017, 21) supposes
that the surplus meaning might come from the presumption that the words
have standards for correct use. He thinks that these standards must be nor-
mative and as such are something extra to the actual use of the terms, which
is factual, and therefore non-normative. I am inclined to be suspicious about
the crude oppositions of normative and factual, but even if meaning is nor-
mative, the use of the terms must be imbued with normativity as well. In
any case, the normativity of the meaning, if there is such a thing, is not a
surplus, something extraneous to the actual use of mental terms.e stan-
dards of correctness are public. ere is no room for hidden standards of
correctness in language use that would allow us to employ the terms as if we
were correct supercially but state that, strictly speaking, our usage fails to
meet the standards.
It is not altogether clear to me why Slors thinks that it is the surplus
meaning that leads to the “as if ” construal. Aer all, one can say that a dis-
course is “as if ” whenever we knowingly treat the things in the discourse as
being in a way other than they actually are. In other words, we pretend that
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the discourse is how it actually is not. is, however, is not a point about
meaning, but about how we choose to treat certain things. So I leave the
meaning aside and discuss the worry about “as if ” in its own terms.
Slors presents one scenario to illustrate his point about an “as if ” con-
strual of interpretivism. Imagine that folk psychology has Cartesian com-
mitments: in ascribing beliefs and desires, people assume that these are
behaviour-causing internal states of the mind. He claims that if it turns out
that there are no such internal states, then “our day-to-day talk about men-
tal states is characterized by reference to non-existing entities”. However,
given that interpretivism is not eliminativism and that it attempts to save the
phenomena, the upshot must be that “we merely pretend there to be mental
states” (Slors 2017, 22). He claims that this reading is dangerous as it turns in-
terpretivism into “an indefensibly radical position” (Slors 2017, 19), and that
the ascription theory has not ruled out such a construal of interpretivism.
What is this radical position? It is instrumentalism, the view that the lore
of intentional ascription is a useful instrument for explaining and predict-
ing behaviour, but in fact the ascriptions are not true and there are no such
entities to which it seems to commit us. Slors refers to (McCulloch 1990)
and (Ravenscro 2005) for such a conception of interpretivism. Note that
Ravenscro labels the position ‘ctionalism’, but given the way he construes
the positions, it does not dier from instrumentalism:
Fictionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that, whilst
strictly speaking there are no mental states, it’s extremely useful to
pretend that there are. (Fictionalism is also known as ‘instrumental-
ism’ since it views the attribution of mental states as having instru-
mental value—and nothing more.) (Ravenscro 2005, 72)
I think that calling instrumentalism ‘ctionalism’ is a misnomer, and I dis-
cuss ctionalism, properly understood, below.
I do not think that the ascription theory is instrumentalist in this sense.
To make this clear let us consider a construal of realism by Crispin Wright
and the ways it is possible to depart from realist elements. Wright (1995, 198)
characterises realism about a discourse as consisting of the following three
components:
(1) Representation: the statements of the discourse have representational
content.
(2) Aiming at truth: the participants of the discourse aim at successful
representation.
(3) Facts: the world cooperates, that is, there are entities as represented
by the statements of the discourse.
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Wright notes that instrumentalists and expressivists typically deny the
rst, representationalist component, ctionalists reject the second compo-
nent, and error-theorists deny the third, viz. that there are facts the discourse
represents there to be. e ascription theory ts none of the moulds. e
ascription statements are about mental states and the people who use them
aim to talk truly about the mind. Although folk psychology can be put to
a variety of uses, including regulative and expressive use, it does not follow
that it has no descriptive use. In my view, the explanatory and predictive use
of mental state ascriptions is central to folk psychology and folk psychology
can be regarded as aiming at the successful representation of mental states.
In a certain sense, the ascription theory oers an account of what this suc-
cessful representation comes to in the mental case.e canonical ascription
could be viewed as providing an objective standard for true or correct as-
criptions of mental states. us, given that an ascription conforms to the
standard of canonicality, one really has the ascribed mental states.ere are
corresponding pleonastic facts or the subject has corresponding pleonastic
properties, so we could also say that the world cooperates. But the world
does not need to contain mental properties in the inationary sense.
Of course, I can say all this since I presumed minimalism about truth
in the book, and a deationary metaphysics for the mind: realism does not
come with serious metaphysical commitments.is was also one of the rea-
sons I preferred not to phrase my claims in terms of realism and truth in
the book: given the heavy baggage these terms bring along, the potential
for misreading is high. At this juncture, one could protest that truth min-
imalism and pleonastic ontology are too shallow to secure the realism of a
robust kind.6 But note that many other positions, generally regarded as re-
alist, also re-conceive the entities that the discourse purports to represent.
Identity theory claims that mental states are actually brain states, and be-
haviourism claims that there are only dispositions to behave and behaviour.
So on these views also there is some slack between what entities the world
contains and what the discourse represents there to be. If we set the bar
of realism so high, only dualism would count as a properly realist position
since it acknowledges the existence of inherently mental robust entities. But
if (say) the identity theory does not count as an error theory of folk psycho-
logy, then neither is the ascription theory an error theory. Ordinary mental
state ascriptions are not erroneous, when they are canonical.
What about the previously mentioned case: what if the folk are Carte-
sian? I do think that the commitments of our folk psychology fall short of
6 Crispin Wright (1995, 207, note 15) later adds the following qualication to his threefold
denition of realism: “it is only in a platitudinous, metaphysically non-committal sense
that our anti-realist may countenance psychological states of aairs.”
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including a commitment to there being internal causally ecacious states of
souls. Nonetheless, let us assume for the sake of argument there is a folk psy-
chology that does include such a commitment. Let us assume also that the
community of such folk is Cartesian even in a stronger sense than Slors envi-
sions: they talk about soul states explicitly and there is a lore about souls that
inuences some of their actions. And this is characteristic to this commu-
nity as a whole, not just some of its members. For if it were the case that just
some people in the community have eccentric ideas aboutwhatmental states
are, then this would not havemuch eect on interpretation in general. Inter-
pretation proceeds from the communal meaning of mental terms, which is
resilient to idiosyncratic deviations. Any individual dierences would crop
up in attributable speaker-meaning.
ere are two dierent ways to interpret such a community. We could
interpret them on the basis of our folk psychology or we could try to make
sense of them in their own terms.
In the rst scenario, we proceed from our own folk psychology, which
presumably does not contain reference to Cartesian souls. From our point of
view it then seems that the people in the Cartesian community are wrong:
there are no soul states. But that need not turn all their attributions false.
Some of them can be regarded as true thanks to the fact that they full the
canonicality requirements: they best t with the available objective informa-
tion and do not require revision. Primarily, this applies to those cases where
there are overlaps between the conceptual schemes of the interpreter and
the interpreted people: the ordinary-looking ascriptions of beliefs and de-
sires and perhaps also of some other states, which are not explicitly couched
as soul states. By ‘those other states,’ I mean states like emotions, thoughts,
etc. that are designated prima facie by ordinarymental state terms. Although
not explicitly labelled as soul states, they are still tacitly taken by the people
in the community to be states of the soul.
Our story includes also cases in which it is crucial that what are ascribed
are explicitly soul states. Such ascriptions occur, for example, when peo-
ple make explicit remarks about mental mechanisms as they conceive them:
‘e energy uctuations in the rational part of the soul mademe choose this
harmful path of action’. Either the contents of attributed beliefs in such cases
mention souls and soul states or soul states are among the states that they
attribute to each other. Now if we let the assumption that there are no souls
“contaminate” how we regard the ascriptions of Cartesian people, then we
are bound to say that the ascriptions of soul states cannot be canonical. For
this very assumption that there are no souls prompts the revision of any such
ascription if it were actually made. At best we could convert all ascriptions
of soul states into beliefs.us instead of the ascription ‘Her soul hurts’, we
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ascribe ‘She believes that her soul hurts’. Such ascriptions of beliefs, the con-
tents of which include explicit reference to the soul and its parts, could still in
principle pass the canonicality test. We could regard them simply as ascrip-
tions of false beliefs, and false and irrational beliefs (from the interpreter’s
point of view) are canonically ascribable (see 164–165).7
e rst scenario thus results in a number of non-canonical ascriptions
or canonical ascriptions of false beliefs if we reconstruct what the subjects
say in terms ofwhat they believe. However, I think that this way of approach-
ing an alien community has some disadvantages. First, although it can throw
light on how we could understand them from our vantage point it does not
uncover how they make sense of themselves in their own terms. We might
miss something crucial about their way of life in the rst scenario (a point
Peter Winch (1964) made long ago). Second, the assumption that there is
an overlap between our and the Cartesian folk psychologies might be overly
optimistic. Why think that we even mean the same thing when both talk
about beliefs and desires? If the existence of souls is indeed the centrepiece
of Cartesian folk psychology and the soul states are strongly linked to other
mental states and observable action, then this would presumably have an
eect on their use of mental state terms and ultimately on what they mean
by ‘beliefs’, ‘desires’ or ‘mental states’. If this is true, we would be dealing
with a dierent folk psychology, and its similarities to ours would be merely
supercial.
Let us then look at the second way of approaching the Cartesian culture.
is scenario holds that the people of the Cartesian community understand
themselves via a folk psychology that is distinct from the one that we are
accustomed to in our daily activities. Let us also make the admittedly un-
Davidsonian assumption that the Cartesian folk psychology is still accessible
to us or whoever are the interpreters of the Cartesian community. In this
scenario, the ascription of soul states and other mental phenomena is based
on a folk psychology that diers from ours, but there is nothing in principle
that stops such ascriptions from coming out as canonical. e Cartesian
folk psychology does not yield defeating assumptions that would require the
ascriptions to be revised (as happened in the rst scenario). Given their folk
psychology, there can be nodierence in the status of soul states as compared
to that of beliefs. If the predicates that they use to attribute soul states have
7 Here I sense some parallels with Dennett’s heterophenomenology, which accepts as data
what the subjects say with “a deliberate bracketing of the issue of whether what they
are saying is literally true, metaphorically true, true under-an-imposed interpretation, or
systematically-false-in-a-way-we-must-explain” (Dennett 2007, 252). But based on this
initial data, the theorist could adopt an eliminativist position towards some things the
subjects have said.
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proper application conditions, one could even get pleonastic properties from
these predicates by Schierian something-from-nothing transformations.
e point is general.is in eect is what it is for the possession of men-
tal states to be interpretation-dependent. When we change the folk psychol-
ogy upon which interpretation relies, we also change the outcome. If an
interpreter with a radically dierent folk psychology were to assess our as-
criptions on the basis of her folk psychology, she would probably dismiss
them as non-canonical.e interpretation is relative to the underlying folk
psychology. But one need not succumb to a total relativism here. Even if
there is no privileged viewpoint from which one could tell which mental
states one “in fact” has, we should prefer the folk psychology that enables us
to make more canonical ascriptions. One could then still say that the inter-
preter who dismisses the majority of our ascriptions as non-canonical has
not congured the lens of the intentional stance properly. She is like Den-
nett’s Martian who misses a real pattern in the data (Dennett 1987, 25–27).
To make the pattern in the data visible, one has to use the proper scheme
and the proper scheme is the one that maximises canonical ascriptions.
Note that neither of these scenarios involves pretence. e ascription
theory is not committed to the claim that ordinary people or Cartesian folk
psychologists merely pretend that they have the states that are ascribable
to them. ey purport to make claims about how the mind is (according
to their conception of it). And as I said earlier, these claims can be given
a representationalist reading. e ascriptions are more than merely useful
instruments. If the interpreter shares the folk psychology with the people,
there can be no inclination to consider the mentalistic discourse as a mere
make-belief, for then our own mental states would also become a matter of
pretence. If the interpreter does not share the folk psychology with the peo-
ple whomake attributions, but proceeds from the alien scheme nevertheless,
then the ascriptions can come out as canonical (given the scheme). If the in-
terpreter does not share the folk psychology with the people and proceeds
from her own scheme, the inclination is rather to reject the misguided attri-
butions than to pretend that they are true.
Finally, I would like to distinguish the ascription theory from ction-
alism. As properly understood, ctionalism about the mental is the view
that the statements in the mental discourse are representational, but do not
aim at truth. ey are just like statements in a ctional story, which are
truth-apt and have meaning, but do not purport to give a true description
of the world. Instead, they have some other, non-epistemic benets. For in-
stance, according to Demeter (2013, 500), who presents a version of mental
ctionalism, the value of folk psychology can be seen in its impact on “social
navigation, the formation of alliances, and our psychological sensibility.” In
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contrast, I think that even if there are all these further things that we can do
withmental state ascriptions, they actually presume the aiming at successful
representation. For how could we navigate successfully in the social world if
we do not believe that our ascriptions aim to represent our minds and those
of our partners? e ascription theory preserves this aim. It says that we
really have those mental states that are canonically ascribable to us. It is not
that we havemental states only according to somementalistic ction. Albeit
pleonastic, there truly are mental facts.e mentalistic talk is indeed a text
that needs interpretation, but it is not a ctional story. It is not a chapter
from the book of the world, for it does not carve nature at its joints. It is a
description of our conception of the mind.
2.3 Pure ascriptivism and counterfactuals
Slors (2017, 17) advocates pure ascriptivism, which he takes to be a “more
stringent formof interpretivism”, for it leaves no room for the “surplusmean-
ing” of the ‘mental’. I have already dealt with the putative “surplus meaning”
andwith the “as if ” reading of interpretivism. In this section, I focus on pure
ascriptivism as Slors presents it.
As argued in section 2.2, the ascription theory does not rely on any sur-
plus meaning over and above our ascription practices, and neither is the “as
if ” reading apt for it. If that is true, then this alone takes the force out of Slors’
argument that pure ascriptivism is the best form of interpretivism. But let
us consider the view on its own merits.
Slors claims that all mental state ascriptions are linked with counterfac-
tuals about what one would do in various situations:
Pure ascriptivism, then, amounts to the idea that themeaning ofmen-
tal state ascriptions hinges on the counterfactuals associatedwith these
ascriptions and the practices of mental state ascription determine the
full range of counterfactuals associatedwith a givenmental state term.
(Slors 2017, 24)
Although it is not fully clear what kind of dependence-relationship is in-
tended by “hinging on”, we can see that this view postulates a tight t indeed
between the ascription practice and the meaning of the mentalistic ascrip-
tions. But note that Slors presents pure ascriptivism as a claim about what
the mental state ascriptions mean. In the rst place, it is a view about the
meaning, not an account of what it takes to have mental states. However, in
Mind Ascribed, I was concerned with the latter account only.
As I already noted, in principle I can agree with Slors that the mental
state ascriptions do not have any further meaning over and above our folk
psychological practices. But let me voice a suspicion that counterfactuals as
such are not a sucient basis for capturing everything that is contained in
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this practice. Must all implications of the prospective and retrospectivemen-
tal state ascription take the counterfactual form? And counterfactuals about
the behaviour evenmore? For one, I am not convinced that all of the various
commitments and entitlements incurred by the ascription of propositional
attitudes can be recast as counterfactuals or if they can, that it is illuminating
to do so.
Be that as it may, as an account of themeaning ofmentalistic ascriptions,
Slors’ pure ascriptivism seems to be prone to a damaging kind of holism.e
counterfactuals linked with each token ascription from the same type could
be dierent, for the predictions about what one would do depend upon one’s
individual features. But then, on this account, there is no single xed mean-
ing to ‘John believes that it is raining’. One could argue that this is ne when
we apply this sentence to dierent Johns, for as dierent persons, theymight
all behave a bit dierently. But I think that the same worry holds when we
apply this sentence to the same John at dierent times. Depending on John’s
other current mental states and dispositions, this ascription could entail dif-
ferent predictions, and hence the sentencemustmean something dierent at
each occasion of its use.is problem with holism does not come up in the
ascription theory, as the ascription theory concerns the possession of men-
tal states, not the meanings of mental state terms or ascription sentences.
Although every ascription is individual—they involve dierent source infor-
mation and can lead to dierent predictions—themeanings of the sentences
used for making the ascriptions are stable and do not vary from case to case.
Slors’ pure ascriptivism—a view that brings counterfactuals to the centre
of things—seems similar to Lynne Rudder Baker’s practical realism (Baker
1995; 2003). On this view, believing something “is a property that some-
one has in virtue of there being a relevant set of true counterfactuals about
the person” (Baker 2003, 185). For Baker those counterfactuals also include
conditionals with actually true antecedents. According to practical realism
then, what beliefs a person has is xed by what that person does, says and
thinks as well as what the person would and would not do, say and think
in dierent situations (Baker 1995, 154–155; 2003, 185–186). However, there
is an important dierence between pure ascriptivism and practical realism.
e latter is not intended as a reductive account of the meaning of believing
and other mental terms. Baker (2003, 185) presents it as a non-reductive ac-
count that lists the necessary and sucient conditions for the possession of
mental properties.
One reason why Baker does not analyse believing that p in terms of sets
of counterfactuals is that ascriptions of the same belief on dierent occasions
can involve quite dierent counterfactuals. Hence believing that p cannot be
reduced to a single set of counterfactuals (Baker 1995, 156). It is basically the
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same worry as the problem with holism mentioned earlier and she avoids
this worry by not giving the counterfactuals a meaning-determining or re-
ductive role in her account.8
Is pure ascriptivism, as Slors construes it, a species of interpretivism at
all? I cannot recognise it as the position I described as “pure ascriptivism”
in the book (81). On that view, it is purely a matter of interpretation what
mental states one has. Interpretability is both a necessary and a sucient
condition for the possession of mental states according to pure ascriptivism.
I regarded it as an extreme position because it leaves no room for objective
constraints on interpretation: if it is necessary and sucient for having a
belief that p that one is interpreted accordingly, then it seems that it is only
the very fact of being interpreted thatmakes it the case that one has the belief
that p.is worry does not go away if one talks about interpretability instead
of actual interpretation, for the potential to be interpreted in itself does not
suce to turn interpretation into an objective matter. My guess is that Slors
calls his version of ascriptivism “pure” because he wants to keep the point
that something (interpretability in my version or the ascription practices in
Slors’ case) exhausts something else (the possession of mental states, or in
his case, themeaning ofmentalistic ascriptions). However, being an account
of the meaning, it is distinct from pure ascriptivism as I construed it.
Furthermore, interpretability is not constitutive in Slors’ version at all.
For instance, he rejects my suggestion that Bakerian counterfactuals could
be regarded as covertly interpretive and thus that the counterfactual account
could be reconciled with interpretivism.9 For Slors, the holding of the rele-
vant counterfactuals is an interpreter-independentmatter.e interpretabil-
ity comes into play insofar as “highlighting those counterfactuals serves prac-
tical purposes, such as predicting further behaviour” (Slors 2017, 25). Here,
the interpretability plays a useful, but an ultimately dispensible role. e
main job is done by the sets of counterfactuals. If one wishes to nd a place
for this view in the interpretivist spectrum, and I do not think that this is
8 In my view Christopher S. Hill’s objection to Baker is misplaced. Hill (1997, 138–139) ar-
gues that it follows from this holism that belief states lack a uniform nature. Given that the
relevant sets include dierent counterfactuals, two tokens of the same belief could have
dierent natures and it becomes unclear what makes them tokens of the same type. How-
ever, Baker does not dene the nature of belief via sets of counterfactuals. In her view,
the set of true counterfactuals are necessary and sucient conditions for having beliefs.
But—as noted above—a similar problem plagues Slors’ pure ascriptivism, which xes the
meanings of mentalistic ascriptions by the sets of counterfactuals.
9 e suggestion was that a full explication of what it is for someone to have a mental state
(e.g. for S to believe that p) even if couched in terms of counterfactuals involves interpre-
tive considerations, although ‘S believes that p’ can be true independently from any actual
interpretation (154–157).
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obligatory, then at most, it would lie at the other extreme from pure ascrip-
tivism (in my sense). It would be a version of revelationism.
2.4 Canonical ascriptions and ideal ascriptions
Henry Jackman concentrates on canonical ascriptions, that is, ascriptions
that x the possession conditions for mental states. Although he acknowl-
edges in the end that my “relaxed” notion of canonicality is superior to the
conception of canonicality in terms of the ideal interpreter, he is not happy
with my reasons for rejecting the ideal conception. In this section I clarify
my position with respect to the criterion of canonicality and give my answer
to Jackman’s critical remarks.
If an interpretivist explicates the possession of mental states through
their ascription, a certain standard is required for distinguishing between
such ascriptions that count for xing the mental states and ascriptions that
are not comprehensive enough for the task. To recap, in the ascription the-
ory, this role is played by the canonical ascriptions, which approximate the
maximum coherence of the information from various sources of evidence
for the ascription and are such that they do not require revision (see 175 for
more exact denition).
Now, Jackman asks why I do not fasten the standard of canonicality to
the ideal ascription. On this view, an ideal ascription would be “maximally
coherent with complete knowledge of all of the ascription sources” (Jackman
2017, 29). Inmy view, which I also outlined in the book, this notion of canon-
icality would make the standard inaccessible to us, the ordinary ascribers of
mental states.10 We are not ideal ascribers, since we are not omniscient. We
are not in possession of a complete knowledge of all the sources of evidence
for the ascription. We cannot compute the perfect coherence, we can only
approximate to maximum coherence. If the ideal ascription were canonical,
our limitations would make our ascriptions substandard, not good enough
for xing the correct interpretation and consequently, the possession condi-
tion.
Jackman points out that in the case where our ascriptions agree with
the ideal ones, we could make canonical ascriptions even if we are not ideal
ascribers ourselves. He adds that “in the absence of any concrete reason
why we should expect such a divergence from the ideal interpreter, it seems
10We are discussing here the typical ascriptions that involve assessing the coherence of sev-
eral sources of evidence. I am thus not considering the admittedly rare cases where one
could be an “ideal interpreter” on the cheap, cases where there is just a single relevant
piece of evidence for the ascription or very few evidence, so that computing the coherence
is undemanding. Such cases, even if they occur, cannot set the standard for the rest.
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doubtful that we should need anything like an a priori guarantee that we will
match such ascriptions.” (Jackman 2017, 33)
Even if our ordinary ascriptions sometimes happen to match those that
the ideal interpreter would make, this would be nothing more than a lucky
coincidence.ere does not seem to be any principled ground as to why our
ascriptions must match with the ideal ones. It would not be mere luck if the
omniscience and absolute computational resources were in principle within
our reach, but they are not.e standard of canonicality is the standard for
mental state possession according to interpretivism. What mental states one
has should be in principle accessible to ordinary interpreters, otherwise the
very sense of attributing minds and mental states is lost. Linking canonical
ascriptions to ideal ascriptions would make the standard accessible for us
merely by a lucky accident.
Jackman claims that there is no reason to expect a dierence between
our ascriptions and those of the ideal interpreter, but it is our imperfection
that provides such a reason. Take an ordinary ascription of a mental state.
An ideal ascription can dier from it in at least two dimensions: rst, it can
take into account a wider range of evidence, and second, even if the con-
sidered information is the same, it can measure the coherence in a better
way. It is thus very likely that the ideal ascription will come out as somewhat
dierent. My conjecture in the book was that our ordinary ascriptions are
usually good enough so that they could count as canonical (and my relax-
ation clause allows this). But if the ideal ascription is canonical by denition,
then even in cases where the ordinary ascriptions do not dier much from
the ideal ones, they cannot count as canonical. Only in those lucky and pre-
sumably rare occasions where they match the ideal ascriptions, they would
have canonical status. But of course, we would not really know if we were
lucky or not, and given our imperfections, there is a prima facie reason to
expect that any particular ascription is of the unlucky sort. is is a more
serious condition than a common fallibilism.
But how could ascriptions that fall short of the ideal ever be deemed
canonical? Jackman (2017, 33–34) points out that even on my relaxed con-
ception, a dierent ascription made by an ideal interpreter would create the
need to revise the original ascription. However, this overlooks one crucial
dierence between the ascriptions we could make and the ascriptions of the
ideal interpreter. All canonical ascriptions according to my theory are such
that they could be actual even if they happen not to be made actually. e
second clause of the denition of the canonical ascription states that if the
ascription were made in fact, it would not require revision (175). is pre-
sumes that it can in fact be made: there is nothing that in principle pre-
cludes such an ascription. e same cannot be said about the ascriptions
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of the ideal interpreter. Ideal interpreters do not dwell in the actual world
and in the worlds relevantly similar to the actual world (called ‘wc worlds’ in
the book). When one talks about ascriptions rather than interpreters, then
a similar point applies: in typical cases, in the actual world and in the wc
worlds, no ascriptions are made that are based on the full knowledge of all
the ascription sources and on a complete computation of maximal coher-
ence. If so, then there can be no actual (and wc-world) scenario in which
an ordinary ascriber would be required to revise one’s ascription in light of
a dierent ideal ascription. Note that the possibility that some ordinary as-
criptions made in a non-ideal way match in content the ascriptions of the
ideal interpreter is not relevant to the present point. For that would be a
case of congruence, not a case of revision-requiring divergence.
Eventually, however, Jackman comes to reject the proposal of dening
canonicality in terms of the ideal interpreter. is has to do with the un-
codiability of interpretation: there is no full codication of the process of
interpretation—not even of the process of nding out which interpretation
ts best with the evidence. Jackman (2017, 36) admits that “there may be
no determinate answer to the question of what set of ascriptions would be
maximally coherent with the ascription sources, and thus no determinate
answer to the question of what mental states an ideal ascriber would ascribe
to us.” Indeed, if ideal ascriptions were to set the canonicality standard, then
given the aforementioned uncodiability, the upshot is that there would be
no determinate canonical ascriptions and therefore, given the link between
canonicality and possession, nothing would determine what mental states
we have. Such an upshot presents a good reason to look for an alternative
account of canonicality.
I believe that my more relaxed conception ts the bill nicely.ere is an
explicit discussion of uncodiability inMind Ascribed (179–181) as well as an
awareness of the danger that it could lead to the disappearance of the mind:
e stipulation about revision gives canonical status to a variety of
ascriptions which pass the relaxed criteria. Hence, there is no need
to worry that uncodiability cum interpretivism leads to the conjec-
ture that, since there is no codiable way to x our mental proles
and since our mental proles depend on such xing, they are either
completely undetermined or we do not have mental states at all. (181)
Nevertheless, it did not occur to me that one could make use of the uncod-
iability considerations as an argument against ideal interpretation. I am
thus grateful to Jackman for pointing this out. However, I do not think that
this argument makes my reasons against ideal interpretation as canonical
ascription superuous.e argument from uncodiability can serve as an-
80 Mind Re-ascribed
other nail in the con of the ideal conception of canonicality, but it does not
have to be the only nail!
I developed two points: the ascriptions made in the ideal manner, even
if possible, would still be beyond our reach, but qua ideal they would trump
our ascriptions; there are no ideal ascriptions or ideal interpreter, at least
not in the actual world or its vicinity. Jackman’s point is a stronger one: even
an ideal interpreter might not come up with a single maximally coherent
ascription.ey all render the notion of an ideal interpreter or an ideal in-
terpretation useless for the purpose of dening canonicality.
Compare this with possible considerations about whether we should
take into account what God does. e analogue for the rst point would
be that we could not enact God’s perfect deeds: by denition they would be
better than ours and therefore would constitute an unreachable standard for
us.e analogue for the second point would be to note that there is no God
anyway (at least not around here). Jackman’s point would be then that there
may be no determinate answer to the question of what God does. ey all
render God’s actions useless for our deliberations.
2.5 Why isn’t it interpretivism?
In this section I answer the questions Häggqvist (2017, 13–15) posed about
central features of the ascription theory.ey pertain to the evidence for an
ascription and the role of rationality in interpretation.
Let us discuss the issue of evidence rst. Häggqvist notes that I did not
touch upon the question of how much evidence is sucient for an ascrip-
tion.is leads to the worry that if very little evidence is acceptable, then it
becomes too easy to nd an ascription that coheres with all the evidence. In
reply Iwould note that the question of the admissible volume of evidence can
only crop up in the case of an actual ascription (and I did discuss singularly
compelling ascriptions in connection with the actual ascription of percep-
tual states, cf. 236–237).ere we can ask how much the interpreter should
know in order to make an acceptable ascription. However, what matters for
the ascription theory is the canonical ascribability and this is a hypothetical
situation in which all relevant information is available. In view of this,—and
this is a point that Häggqvist also noted—one can expect that the actual as-
criptions made on the basis of scant evidence are not up to the standard of
canonicality.
Häggqvist also asks if other ascribable mental states can be viewed as ev-
idence source equal to the other kinds of evidence such as behaviour, stimuli
and personal background. As these are also ascribable, should they not be
the product of interpretation, rather than its source? My answer is that their
status as evidence is relative to each ascription. e fact that these other
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mental states are ascribable in a given situation constrains the ascription of
a particular mental state, since mental states are interlinked in a holistic net-
work. Of course, evidence is needed for the ascription of these other mental
states too, but that evidence should in turn include information about yet
further mental states. I do not think that the interpretation could proceed
solely on the basis of a subject’s behaviour and environment, without taking
into account its mental prole.
e holism of mental states brings us to the role of rationality in inter-
pretation. I did indeed reject the common notion that interpretation must
presume the rationality of its objects. However, I do not see this as so big a
break with tradition to warrant the suspicion that thereby the ascription the-
ory ceases to be a form of interpretivism—contra what Häggqvist suggests
in his title and in the last passage of his contribution. My point was sim-
ply that the stress on rationality generated lots of unnecessary disputes that
overshadowed what is really crucial for interpretation. And this is that inter-
pretation requires only links betweenmental states, behaviour, environment
and background, such that it would be possible to move from the sources to
the ascription. If those links are rational and can be subsumed under some
theory of rationality, it is all well and good, but they do not have to be ratio-
nal or conform to some generally accepted norms. One could deviate from
rational norms in all sorts of ways and one’s mental states could be related
in ways we normally deem to be irrational. However, this does not make
the interpretation of such a subject impossible, since we can become aware
of such deviations and irrational relations. It just makes the interpretation
more dicult in actual cases.
Similarly, the internal consistency of a subject’s beliefs is not necessary
for an ascription, but it does not follow that we cannot sometimes assume
such consistency. When the interpretation should aim to maximise the co-
herence of an ascription with the sources of evidence and that evidence also
includes other ascribable mental states, then this would also maximise the
consistency of a subject’s beliefs. But this does not preclude the possibility
that in some cases the best interpretation is the one in which a subject’s be-
liefs are not all internally consistent or rationally linked. I do not see the
ascription of inconsistent bundles of beliefs as presenting a special kind of
worry. is can be done on the basis of information about a subject’s id-
iosyncrasies, which could range from severe delusions to merely misaligned
sets of attitudes. Some of this evidence can come fromwhat the subject talks
about and the way he or she talks.e so-called verbal behaviour can con-
stitute an important piece of evidence for the interpretation. To be sure, in
some cases one might mean something uncommon by one’s words, but this
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would merely be a matter of ascribing a dierent speaker meaning, and this
can be accommodated by the ascription theory (cf. 125).
What tomake ofDennett’s rabbit-bird example thatHäggqvist (2017, 14–
15) presents as a case showing the need for internal consistency? As it stands,
it is just an excerpt, which cannot be made intelligible without further in-
formation. I thus agree with Dennett and Häggqvist that a fuller story is
needed for its interpretation. I suggest that this story would bring out those
presumably idiosyncratic connections between the man’s beliefs or his de-
viant meanings. Perhaps this makes him internally fully consistent. Perhaps
not. In any case, given such further information we would also be able to
interpret him within the framework of the ascription theory. I thus do not
see a reason to worry that my view is not a species of interpretivism.
3. Normativity, patterns and self-knowledge
For the last part of this paper, I have collected those comments on topics
that do not t under the headings of the rst two parts. is part is thus
inevitablymore diverse—ranging fromnormativity to self-knowledge. I also
comment on the role of the brain in having mental states and on the correct
understanding of Dennett’s notion of real patterns.e contributors whose
comments I address in this section are Dave Beisecker, Sören Häggqvist and
Dominic Murphy.
3.1 e curious case of normativity
In this section I address two signicant and related omissions in the book
highlighted by Dave Beisecker: Sellars and normativity. I comment rst on
Sellars rather briey, but the bulk of this section is dedicated to normativity,
a tangled topic of its own.
Beisecker (2017, 47–48) draws attention to the lack of engagement with
Wilfrid Sellars’ ideas in my book. In this respect I can echo Dennett (1987,
349), who quipped, when talking about himself, Davidson and Bennett: “Al-
most no one cites Sellars, while reinventing his wheels with gratifying reg-
ularity”. He explains this by pointing to the fact that philosophers tend to
be slow to even recognize approaches that are similar to their own views,
while being very fast to acknowledge approaches that are the outright op-
posites of their own views. In my case this is more due either to me not
having been suciently familiar with all the potentially relevant Sellarsian
ideas that Beisecker mentions or to me not seeing their relevance, and I am
grateful for his suggestions. However, I am less inclined to tie thought so
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tightly to speech, and thus I am not sure if I could adopt Sellars’ ideas on
self-knowledge in a straightforward manner.11
With respect to direct inuences of Sellars on me, I am aware of just
two: rst, the force of the general contention that our mental concepts are
in some respects theoretical and second, I made a conscious eort not to fall
into to the trap posed by the myth of the given when building my account
of perception. If there are any other inuences, then these must be second-
hand, through Sellars’ inuence on Dennett, Davidson and other writers.
Beisecker (2017, 52) actually takes Sellars to be a kind of interpretivist,
which I nd a bit of a stretch. Commonly, Sellars is seen as an inuence on
the development of functionalism and theory theory, both of which stand
apart from interpretivism. As Beisecker notes, Sellars can indeed be re-
garded as the father of normative functionalism, but he considers this view
to be a version of interpretivism. Normative functionalism conceives its tar-
gets (e.g. assertions, concepts or meanings) in terms of their inputs and out-
puts, where these are both understood normatively: i.e. with reference to the
dierence that their use makes on the normative status of the participants
of the interaction. is in itself need not amount to interpretivism. It will
not if the interpretive considerations are not constitutive of those inputs and
outputs. I imagine that normative functionalism can be developed in ways
compatible with interpretivism, but I am not convinced that Sellars himself
gave interpretation a constitutive role in his account. I will come back to the
normative functionalist approach later in this section, but before that, some
general comments on normativity are in order.
e attention to and even the mention of normativity is curiously ab-
sent from my book in Beisecker’s (2017, 49) opinion. He suspects that this
is not accidental and he is right. At the time of writing the book I had not
really made up my mind concerning the relationship between normativity
and the mental and at the same time I felt the force of the anti-normativist
arguments in the literature to the eect that meaning and content are not
normative. I thus thought it is wise not to make my arguments for interpre-
tivism depend upon an unexamined reliance on normativity.12 For if it turns
out that mental states are not normative in the required ways, this damages
my case for interpretivism. And if they are normative in the right kind of
way, then perhaps this could be used to make a further case for the ascrip-
11 For crucial dierences between thinking and speaking from the pragmatist perspective,
see (Kukla and Lance 2016).
12 us I do not agree with Beisecker (2017, 51) that the normativity of belief ascription ex-
plains why I regard the mental as pleonastic and with no direct empirical commitments.
Mymain reason for treatingmental entities as pleonastic is that there simply are nomental
entities in the inationary sense. If so, one should not expect to locate such entities in the
brain or to think that they line up with other inationary entities of the natural basis.
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tion theory, but this may be le as a matter for future work. At present, I am
still not entirely settled on the issue of normativity. However, I have become
even more inclined to think that truth, meaning and intentionality are not
constitutively normative (see Mölder 2008; Mölder 2011).
What then are the reasons for my scepticism concerning normativity?
Let me say at the outset that I do not deny that our relationships with each
other are sometimes normative: we obey norms, hold each other account-
able for what we say and try to honour our commitments. Our actions are
guided by how things ought to be, and sometimes we do and say things be-
cause we should do and say them. I also think that “mindshaping” (Mameli
2001; McGeer 2007; Zawidzki 2013) is a neat idea, which—when its norma-
tivity is properly “tamed”—goes a long way toward explaining why folk psy-
chology holds us sway: since folk psychology regulates how we make sense
of each other, it shapes our minds into such forms that can be understood
in terms of that very framework itself.
However, I advise extreme caution against jumping to philosophically
substantial conclusions from all this. It seems to me that sometimes peo-
ple assume that since something is related to norms, correctness conditions,
rules, rationality, sociality or values, it necessarily makes that thing norma-
tive. But this is not the case. Separate arguments are needed to move from,
say, rationality or sociality to normativity proper (cf. Gibbard 2003, 85).13
Moreover, I take it that the normativity of some phenomenon becomes
philosophically puzzling if and only if that phenomenon is essentially nor-
mative. is is to say that the nature of that phenomenon is determined
by normative facts or, epistemically, that a complete account of the phe-
nomenon must inevitably be couched in normative terms. In only that case
is there a substantial problem about the place of that phenomenon in the
natural (non-normative) world and its reduction has slim prospects: we are
unlikely to be able to account for the phenomenon in non-normative terms.
Aer all, a phenomenon can be related to normative aairs (e.g. having nor-
mative consequences), and yet not itself be essentially normative (Horwich
1998, 188).
e kind of normativity at issue in the case ofmeaning and intentionality
is deontic normativity. It is common to explicate this in terms of prescrip-
tivity (Glüer andWikforss 2018).us if meaning or intentionality are truly
normative, they are inextricably bound with prescriptions, which guide our
13 Timothy Schroeder (2003) argues in similar vein that although Davidson’s account re-
lies on rationality and consistency that by itself does not make his account normative.
In Schroeder’s reading, Davidson’s account includes norms, understood as categorization
schemes, but the “force-makers” of these norms, which are required for genuine norma-
tivity, play no role in his theory.
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actions and tells us what we ought to do. I alreadymentioned the compelling
anti-normativist trend in the literature.14 One strategy the anti-normativists
employ is to distinguish kinds of ‘ought’, which fall short of essential norma-
tivity, and argue that the alleged normativity that is linked with correctness
conditions or rules is in fact not the essential normativity of the required
kind, but instead upon closer inspection turns out to be descriptive. I can-
not rehearse these discussions here, but I bring out some of their pertinent
points concerning the normativity of meaning and content.
One such relevant distinction is a division between categorical and
hypothetical prescriptions (Wikforss 2001; Hattiangadi 2006; Hattiangadi
2007). A categorical prescription holds irrespective of one’s desires and it
cannot be overridden by them. It is not instrumental on one’s wanting to
achieve some goal. Hypothetical prescriptions, by contrast, command one
only if further pragmatic conditions hold: one ought to do something if one
wants to get a certain result. For example, ‘If you want to nish your dra
during the week, you ought to start writing now’ is a hypothetical prescrip-
tion, which holds on the condition that you want to get your dra done dur-
ing the week.e anti-normativists’ claim is that the essential normativity of
meaningmust be of the categorical kind, and it has not been established that
it amounts to more than hypothetical prescriptivity.e latter is not enough
to secure the essential normativity of a phenomenon, because hypothetical
prescriptions can be analysed as being essentially descriptive (Hattiangadi
2006, 228).e statement in the above example can be viewed as describing
a way of nishing a paper on time, not as instituting a genuinely normative
commitment. Similarly, if one wants to be understood by others, one ought
to speak in a certain way (cf. Bilgrami 1993, 135). But this is conditional on
one’s desires and intentions.
Another distinction is that between normativity and norm-relativity
(Hattiangadi 2007, 7; Finlay 2010, 332; Hattiangadi 2017, 650–651). Norma-
tivity involves categorical prescriptions as outlined above. Norm-relativity
pertains to norms that set a standard. For instance, norms that x the use
of words as correct and incorrect are normative in the sense of being norm-
relative. What makes this distinction important is that meeting a standard
itself is not normative (Glüer 1999). It does not yield prescriptions. On the
contrary, the statements of standard-setting norms are descriptive.ey de-
scribe the standard that something either meets or not.is applies to cor-
rectness as well, as Hattiangadi (2007, 60) argues: “To say that some use of
an expression is correct is . . . to say that it refers to or is true of the thing to
14 e representative publications of this trend include (Glüer 1999), (Glüer and Pagin 1999),
(Wikforss 2001), (Hattiangadi 2006), (Hattiangadi 2007) and (Glüer and Wikforss 2009).
For recent overviews, see (Hattiangadi 2017) and (Glüer and Wikforss 2018).
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which it has been applied. If we keep this rmly in view, it no longer makes
sense to gloss ‘correct’ as ‘ought to be pursued’ but rather as ‘meets a stan-
dard”’. On this view, distinguishing between the correct and incorrect use
of a word by some norm of use is to supply a standard that sorts the uses of
words into those that refer to what they have been applied to and those that
do not.is is not normative; it just describes a way of sorting.
What to make of Beisecker’s (2017, 49) charge that I have “downplayed”
“the essentially normative dimension ofmental states and their ascriptions”?
Armed with the outlined distinctions, it is possible to argue that intentional
states are not essentially normative, although they can be related to norms
and be linked to hypothetical prescriptions. Of course, this point depends on
how the wider battle between the normativists and anti-normativists pans
out, but I think that the anti-normativists have made a good case for the
claim that the mind is not essentially normative. If that is true, then an ac-
count of the mind or intentionality worthy of its name need not bear the
burden of explaining their essential semantic normativity, although it needs
to acknowledge the role of norm-relativity and hypothetical prescriptions.
And of course, if the aim is to account for the mind in a wider cultural and
social context, then the other kinds of norms, such as prudential, moral,
evaluative etc. should be heeded too, but I suppose they are less resistant to
naturalization than the alleged semantic normativity.
However, what about the fact that in the ascription theory the possession
of mental states is constituted by their canonical interpretability, while the
interpretation relies on various presumably normative principles? Does this
not all by itself make the possession of mental states an essentially norma-
tive aair? In reply I would like to point out rst that canonical ascribability
condition is best viewed as providing a standard for sorting the ascriptions
into those that are constitutive for themental state possession and those that
are not. As noted before, such standards are descriptive, rather than norma-
tive. Second, the principles of ascription (161–163) can indeed be formulated
as rules for the interpreters. However, the normativity of those principles
thus articulated is then hypothetical in the sense above, and not categori-
cal. ey take the conditional form: if you want to ascribe mental states,
here are certain things you should take into account. As such the principles
merely describe a way of coming to a denitive interpretation of the sub-
ject’s mind. Neither the principles nor the canonical ascribability standard
have “normative oomph”.15 at is, the failure to follow the principles and
to meet the canonicality condition is not normative failure. It only results in
non-canonical ascriptions. ese principles and the canonicality standard
do not bind us: we do not have to follow them no matter what. One has
15 See (Copp 2015, 142) for this notion.
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to follow them if one wants to ascribe mental states, but this is so on the
condition that one has such an aim.
Beisecker (2017, 50) stresses also the normativity of folk psychological
platitudes. He compares them to norms of conduct and conceives them as
“normative principles guiding our enforcement of rational norms”. He sug-
gests that conceiving folk platitudes as normative is more illuminating than
treating them as empirical generalizations. I agree that we can do many
things with folk psychology besides explaining and predicting others’ be-
haviour. We can use it to regulate the actions of others.is shows that folk
psychology can be used in normative ways, but I do not think that this nor-
mativity is categorical. If folk platitudes can be laid out (and I harboured
some doubts about this in Chapter 4), then even if they are not empiri-
cal generalisations, they would be statable in a straightforwardly descriptive
form. I think this holds especially if folk platitudes are likened to codes of
conduct, since the latter are never categorical. ey are hypothetical pre-
scriptions, which are at bottom descriptive.
At this point, a defender of the essential normativity of themental might
object that my rejoinders have missed what is crucial on this issue: namely,
that the communal background of norms is a condition for the very pos-
sibility of thought and language. It is not something that one could sim-
ply adopt if one wants. Neither can one opt out of following these norms
without ceasing to be treated as a rational thinker by other members of the
community.16 Put in the terminology of the ascription theory, the posses-
sion of mental states is constituted by canonical ascribability, and the latter
relies upon the principles of interpretation and upon folk psychology. e
normativist could argue that those make up the normative and inescapable
background for the possession of mental states. If it were not for these nor-
mative relations, one would not havemental states. For this reason, it cannot
be claimed that the normativity at issue is merely hypothetical, for one can-
not merely choose to be bound by these norms.
I am not swayed by this line of reasoning. For a start, I would like to
point out that not following these norms does not preclude the ascription
of mental states. Only those ascriptions would not count as canonical.is
reply, however, does not touch the point that the canonical ascription consti-
tutes the possession of mental states. But note that the claim that canonical
ascription is imbued by norms requires independent backing. For it might
turn out that it is not normative aer all. To show this I will make use of
16 Similar considerations are presented against anti-normativists by e.g. Cash (2008, 104) and
Buleandra (2008, 185).
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yet another argument from the anti-normativist toolbox.17 e basic idea is
that constitutive conditions cannot full a normative role, since they cannot
generate prescriptions. Prescriptions imply that it is possible to violate them.
But if the principles of ascription and folk platitudes are constitutive of men-
tal state possession, then they determine (or play a role in determining) what
it is to have mental states. ey cannot prescribe what a canonical ascriber
ought to do, since she could not violate such a prescription. e canonical
ascriber has no other option than to make the ascription in the canonical
manner, for otherwise she would, by denition, not be a canonical ascriber.
us these principles and platitudes should not be construed as norms.
In sum, I proposed two separate escape routes from the conclusion that
the ascription theory implies that the mental is essentially normative.ese
routes depend on the way in which the consideration in favour of normativ-
ity is spelled out. On the rst route, the defender of normativity proposes to
recast the principles of ascription as rules for interpreters. However, in that
case I would argue that if construed in this way, those rules are hypotheti-
cal in nature and this is not enough for genuine normativity. On the second
route, the normativity is alleged to stem from the constitutive role that the
principles play in the possession of mental states. But then the escape lies
in the very constitutivity: for constitutive conditions determine but do not
prescribe.
Let us return now to normative functionalism, in the direction of which
Beisecker tries to nudge me. Could the ascription theory be complemented
with an approach along the lines of le-wing Sellarsians? I take it that it
is characteristic of these philosophers, of which Robert Brandom (1994) is
the most prominent example, that they take Sellars’ (1997, 76) metaphor of
“the logical space of reasons” very seriously and conceive meaning and in-
tentionality as normative phenomena residing in a dierent “space” from
the one in which phenomena are described by the empirical sciences. is
approach understands norms in relation to social practices, for the norms
govern common social practices and can be manifested in them. Without
17 is tool is used byGlüer (1999; 2001),Wikforss (2001, 215), Glüer andWikforss (2009, 48–
52) and Glüer and Wikforss (2018). It is mostly applied on Davidson’s principle of charity.
Here is one characteristic statement of this point:
the very idea that content attributions have to respect the basic standards of
rationality, implies that these standards cannot be taken to be prescriptive.
at intentional creatures by and large do accord with the basic standards
of rationality is, on this view, a condition of their being intentional crea-
tures, a condition of being able to follow and accept norms, not something
prescribed to already intentional creatures. (Glüer and Wikforss 2009, 52)
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going into full details of Brandom’s account, I close this section with some
more or less impressionistic remarks about the prospects of such comple-
mentation.
In certain respects, this has the potential to strengthen the case for the
ascription theory. Remember that the ascription theory presupposed the
feasibility of a general theory of meaning, but did not provide one itself. An
account along Brandomian lines could perhaps provide such an account of
meaning. A wholehearted embrace of normativity could also provide fur-
ther support for interpretivism if one could show that only an interpretivist
approach could do justice to the inherent normativity of intentional states.
Finally, such a partnership could bring the nature and the possession ofmen-
tal states together again, provided that the latter is understood in ascriptive
terms. For Brandom’s account can be construed as giving the nature of atti-
tudes in terms of how we acknowledge and attribute them. In his terms, this
amounts to explaining entitlements and commitments or “deontic statuses”
through “deontic attitude”, which is the attitude of taking one as thus entitled
or committed (see Brandom 1994, 165–166).
However, even if all this would seem to make the theory stronger I am
not sure it could really work out. First, there is the danger that fusing na-
ture and possession in such a way would obliterate the theoretical role of
ascription entirely. ere is no point in adding my notion of canonical as-
cription to Brandomian deontic practice.e interactive “practice of giving
and asking for reasons” does not require that each mental state be canoni-
cally ascribable. Furthermore, one could also dispense with mental states as
states given the role deontic attitudes and statuses play in Brandom’s account,
and along with mental states the pleonastic entities should go as well.18
Second, adding a theory of meaning to the ascription theory should
avoid circularity. ere is a danger of circularity if the ascription theory
presumes that words have meanings, but an account of meaning in turn
crucially relies on the possession of mental states, where this possession is
conceived in the interpretivist way. And of course if mental states in such
a theory are understood along some non-interpretivist lines, that would be
even worse, for then the theory of meaning would posit mental states that
are not captured by the ascription theory.
At rst glance, Brandom’s approach seems quite promising in this re-
gard as he elucidates meaning through our communal practices. However,
18 Gauker’s (2003) communicative conception would be another example of an account that
rejects beliefs as internal states. He understands the nature of beliefs in terms of their
attribution and conceives the latter as assertions performed on someone else’s behalf. I, on
the other hand, think that there is no need to eschewmental states as long as one conceives
them in an ontologically deationary way. See also the discussion on 148–150.
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it seems that this elucidation still invokes the ascription of mental states or
intentionality. Brandom (1994) sets out to explain how the correctness—that
some applications of concepts are correct and others incorrect—, which he
regards as a normative matter arises from social practices, which are also es-
sentially normative. In his account, deontic statuses are explained in terms
of deontic attitudes.at is, commitments and entailments are explained in
terms of the attributions of commitments and entailments within the deon-
tic practice. At this point one could start to worry about the status of the
deontic attitudes themselves (cf. Zawidzki 2015, 600).ese consist in “tak-
ing or treating someone as committed or entitled” (Brandom 1994, 166), and
look very much like intentional states. To be sure, Brandom does not con-
strue them as explicit attitudes.ese “takings” can be implicit in a commu-
nity practice in the pattern of sanctioning certain applications of concepts
and reinforcing others. Sanctions and reinforcements in turn can in themost
primitive case be conceived as behavioural dispositions.19 us the practice
implicitly comes to embody norms for the correct application of concepts.
It seems that if such a picture is joined to the ascription theory, then
such a picture—one which founds correctness conditions on behavioural
roots—would not create the circularity problem, although it may pose di-
culties on a dierent front; namely in adjudicating the relationship between
interpretivism and dispositionalism. However, Brandom cannot rest con-
tent with a purely dispositional picture (one probably accepted by Sellars),
since that seems not to have enough resources to dispel the familiar rule-
following concerns (see Millikan 2005, 62–63; Hattiangadi 2007, 164–165).
For one cannot read owhich rule has been followed (which use of a concept
is correct) by attending to mere dispositions as manifested in the practice.
Brandom alleviates such concerns by reference to the external interpretation
of the practice that discerns which norms the community in fact has:
e general point is that while normative interpretation of a commu-
nity as engaged in one set of practices rather than another is under-
determined by nonnormatively specied actual behavior, regularities
of behavior, and behavioral dispositions, relative to such an interpreta-
tion, concepts nevertheless are objective, shared, and unambiguously
projectable. (Brandom 1994, 633; see also 648)
us beside the non-normative behavioural dispositions, there is a need for
an interpreter who interprets the whole community as taking part in prac-
tices that are linguistic and implicitly normative. But if this reading of Bran-
dom’s project is correct, then his approach invokes interpretation at the cru-
19 us writes Brandom (1994, 166): “Adopting this practical attitude can be explained, to
begin with, as consisting in the disposition or willingness to impose sanctions.”
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cial juncture, and thatmakes it incompatible with an account like the ascrip-
tion theory, which presupposes that meaning is determined independently
from interpretation.
ird, I have already expressed my reservations about the essential nor-
mativity of the mental. I do not deny that the application of mental terms
may have normative consequences, but I do not think that these conse-
quences dene those terms or are somehow essential to them. If this is on the
right track, then the consideration from normativity cannot be marshalled
into an argument for interpretivism. For if the mind is not essentially nor-
mative in the relevant sense, then it cannot be argued that the interpretivist
approach is preferable, since it accommodates the normativity better than
the other theories.
I also share the naturalist’s scruples about primitive and ungrounded
normativity. To echo Mackie (1977), the categorically prescriptive things in
the world are spooky if they are not grounded on or explained by the non-
normative facts. Normative functionalists like Sellars and Brandom think
that such worries can be alleviated by presenting genetic stories or myths
about how the problematic terms became adopted in communities that orig-
inally had no use for them (cf. Beisecker 2012, 114). I can see some appeal
in such an approach but to my mind the utility of genetic myths is still re-
stricted given that such stories depict idealised situations, which were never
actually the case.20 And even if one could concoct an illuminating genetic
story about how the norms evolved in a pre-normative community, we still
need to explain what, metaphysically speaking, norms are. Even if norma-
tive vocabulary is irreducible, then what about the norms themselves? What
grounds them? Do they have causal powers? For such questions, and I think
they are legitimate questions, genetic stories give no answers.
To conclude, let me emphasize that I do not want to leave the impres-
sion that in my view norms and normativity play no role in understanding
the mind. My contention is rather that the normativity at issue is of a rather
innocuous kind which neither creates grand philosophical puzzles nor gives
a reason for regarding themental as uniquely prone to an interpretivist treat-
ment.
20eir utility is also limited if such stories smuggle in the very properties they were devised
to illuminate. For instance, Haugeland’s (1990, 404–405) story about the origin of norms
involved creatures with “wired in” conformism, a disposition to imitate and censor others.
But this sidesteps the clearly relevant questions of where the disposition to conform comes
from and why they evolved to censor other members of the community?
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3.2 Brain, beliefs and the folk
Beisecker (2017) takes me to task for the (presumably) thoughtless endorse-
ment of Lynne Rudder Baker’s “incautious statement” that the brain is nec-
essary for having beliefs.21 In fact, no such endorsement was present in my
text.e context of that discussion was an objection to the idea that mental
properties are composed by or constituted by physical properties; for this
leads to an unreasonable reication of mental entities. My whole point of
quoting Baker in 66 was to illustrate one crucial dierence between mental
states like beliefs and brain states: beliefs are not spatiotemporal entities like
brain states. If they are entities in some other sense or of some other kind,
how could they be composed of brain states? Now, Baker’s claim was that
there is this dierence between beliefs and brain states even if having the
latter is a necessary condition for having the former. I think it is charitable
to read her (at least in that quote) as supposing this for the sake of argument,
but not necessarily as an endorsement.
Notwithstanding this particular quote by Baker, is having a brain nec-
essary for having beliefs and other mental states? What is the stance of the
ascription theory on that very question? As also hinted on 193, the ascrip-
tion theory leaves this question for folk psychology to settle.e ascription
theory presumes that mental states are pleonastic entities and, accordingly,
their nature is xed by the respective mental terms. What it takes to have
mental states—their possession conditions—is xed by what it takes to ap-
plymental terms. In other words, we need to nd out whether the ascription
of beliefs and other mental states relies upon the fact that the subject of as-
cription has a brain. Note that such a connection between the ascription
and the necessary condition is enabled by interpretivism. Without assum-
ing interpretivism, the ascription practices of people could not be helpful in
this regard.e issue of whether brain states are necessary for mental states
would have to be settled independently in such a case.
It is possible to object that the ascriptions that lay people make are not
canonical, and therefore have no bearing on the metaphysical issue even
when we presume interpretivism. According to the ascription theory, how-
21 e whole quote is the following:
Having certain kinds of brain statesmay be necessary for having beliefs; but
it does not follow that particular brain states constitute particular beliefs.
Brain states are ordinary spatiotemporal entities. Spatiotemporal entities
are not widely scattered objects, but are compact objects that have more or
less denite boundaries in space in time. A belief is nomore constituted by
an ordinary spatiotemporal entities than is the British Constitution. (Baker
1995, 184–185)
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ever, these ascriptions are canonical if no revisions are required or if they are
stable (to use Häggqvist’s helpful term). We should thus consider only stable
ascriptions when looking at lay people’s ascription practices.
Recently, experimental philosophers have conducted several studies in-
vestigating how lay people attribute mental states. e results seem to sug-
gest that people do not hesitate to ascribe intentions, beliefs and in some
cases also phenomenal states to groups, robots, ghosts and other entities
that do not have a biological brain, and hence do not have any brain states.
It could turn out that the answer to the question of whether having a brain is
necessary for having mental states will not be a uniform one: there are some
experimental studies showing that people are reluctant to attribute certain
mental states like feeling pain to groups or robots, while routinely ascrib-
ing beliefs and other attitudes to them (Knobe and Prinz 2008). e jury
is still out on how the data resulting from these studies is to be interpreted
(see (Sytsma 2016) for a recent overview). Philosophers also debate whether
the ascription of phenomenal states presumes the existence of a biological
body or not, and there is some evidence that even phenomenal states are as-
cribed on the basis of functional cues such as behaviour, other mental states
and stimuli with no regard to embodiment (Buckwalter and Phelan 2014).
However, one can glean the following minimal message from these studies:
if lay people attribute at least some kinds of mental states to disembodied
and other entities that have no brains, then this suggests that having a brain
is not regarded as a necessary condition for the ascription of every kind of
mental state. Given interpretivism, this allows us tomove from ascription to
possession and to deny that the brain plays a necessary role in havingmental
states.
is brings me to a related question about the relationship between folk
psychology and the ascription theory. Häggqvist (2017, 13) records his dis-
appointment that I do not present a separate account about what it is to be a
believer. Instead I rely on folk psychology for this. Indeed I do not think that
such a separate story is needed, but I do not see a reason for disappointment
over this. is is a feature of the ascription theory, not a bug. Given that
the theory does not set substantial conditions on believers it can be comple-
mented with dierent folk psychologies or even with a scientic psychology.
For instance, certain subpersonal constructs of a psychological theory can
also be canonically ascribable in accordance with the ascription theory and
thus be placed within the interpretivist framework (cf. 71–72). By deferring
to the folk, the ascription theory secures a link with the empirical reality.
What we regard as a thinker is an empirical question about folk practice,
not something that should be xed from the armchair. Häggqvist writes as
if the fact that the ascription theory is a metaphysical account of the posses-
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sion conditions of mental states requires such an armchair account. But I do
not think that there is such a requirement. Even if the ascription theory is
not an empirical account of our psychology, it is a theory about the mental
states as we, the folk, understand them.is is why I stressed the importance
of not losing contact with ordinary practice in the book.
3.3 On intentional patterns
What is the proper understanding of Dennett’s “real patterns”? Häggqvist
(2017, 16) suggests that, forDennett, patterns are just “patterns in behaviour”
and thus “they are not themselves “intentional””. He notes correctly that
when discussing Dennett’s position in Mind Ascribed I sometimes wrote
about intentional patterns and understood them in the sense of patterns of
intentional states. Was it then a slip-up?
Letme point out rst that the term “intentional pattern” is notmy inven-
tion; it is widely used in the literature (e.g. Bennett 1991, 25; Baker 1994; Slors
2001, 212–213; Brook and Ross 2002, 21). Even one subsection in Dennett’s
“Real Patterns” is titled “e Reality of Intentional Patterns” (Dennett 1991,
42).e term also occurs in his earlier writings, collected ine Intentional
Stance.22
e idea behind Dennett’s talk about patterns is to highlight that a pat-
tern is real if it becomes discernible as a result of the compression of data.
If no ecient compression is possible, and the data can be reproduced only
through an exact copy, then it lacks a real pattern inDennett’s sense (Dennett
1991, 34; Zawidzki 2007, 145). Dennett applies this idea to the explanation
of behaviour in intentional terms. If approaching a certain process from
the intentional stance can yield a pattern that would be invisible amidst the
myriad of data, as conceived in physical terms, then we have detected a real
intentional pattern.
But what is this pattern, really? Is it just a complex behavioural trajec-
tory? Note that this wouldmakeDennett’s position almost indistinguishable
from behaviourism. If the patterns were merely behavioural, then it would
be unclear what the fuss is about their being real. Nowadays it is hard to nd
someone who denies the reality of behaviour, and it would be uncharitable
22 Here are two examples from this book: “It is important to recognize the objective reality of
the intentional patterns discernible in the activities of intelligent creatures, but also impor-
tant to recognize the incompleteness and imperfections in the patterns.” (Dennett 1987,
28; my italics)
“It is as hard to saywhere the intentional order is as it is to saywhere the intentional patterns
are in the Life world. If you “look at” the world in the right way, the patterns are obvious.
If you look at (or describe) the world in any other way, they are, in general, invisible.”
(Dennett 1987, 39; my italics)
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to hold that Dennett was defending only a “mild” realism of behavioural pat-
terns. By invoking the notion of real patterns, Dennett sought to secure a sta-
tus for intentional states that would be more realist thanmere instrumental-
ism. But if the real patternswere only behavioural patterns, then that by itself
would do nothing to secure a realist standing for intentional states. Further-
more, when the patterns in behaviour were understood in non-intentional
terms, then those would also be easily discernible from the physical stance,
as they are just complex physical movements.e intentional stance would
be redundant on such a reading.
Let us search for another answer. Consider the following quotation from
Dennett:
Are there beliefs? Of course. We already know that there are robust,
reliable patterns inwhich all behaviorally normal people participate—
the patterns we traditionally describe in terms of belief and desire and
the other terms of folk psychology. (Dennett 1988, 501)
As Dennett writes, the patterns under scrutiny are patterns described in
folk psychological terms. What emerges from this is a reading of Dennett’s
patterns as structures that are given descriptions in intentional vocabulary.
ese descriptions involve belief and desire attributions, a conception of ac-
tions as driven by intentions and so on. In short, to discern intentional pat-
terns is tomake sense of something that from the physical stance would look
like incomprehensible strings of physicalmovements. To discern intentional
patterns is to make sense of intentional action in terms of intentional states
(cf. also Nelkin 1994, 61).
It might seem, however, that “the patterns that we characterize in terms
of the beliefs, desires, and intentions of rational agents” (Dennett 1987, 27)
still blurs some important distinctions. For instance, BrianMcLaughlin and
John O’Leary-Hawthorne (1994, 209) claim that it runs together “the pat-
terns of dispositions to peripheral behavior that get interpreted from the in-
tentional stance” and “the belief-desire patterns that patterns of dispositions
get interpreted as being”.
I think that there are actually two related distinctions here: one is worth
making, but the other cannot be applied to Dennett’s patterns. Let us start
with the latter. is is a distinction between the ontological nature of pat-
terns (‘What patterns really are?’) and our epistemic take on them (‘How
we make sense of the patterns?’). But no such distinction can be had on a
reading ofDennett’s patterns as recognition-dependent entities (which I also
defended in the book; see the quotes on page 116). If patterns are such that
they can be discerned only by taking the intentional stance and by applying
intentional vocabulary, then they do not have non-epistemic identity condi-
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tions. What could be discerned and individuated from the physical stance
is an unintelligible complexity, not an intentional pattern.
e distinction that is at least sometimes important to keep is the one
between patterns of action and dispositions to act, on the one hand, and the
patterns of beliefs, desires, thoughts and other mental states, on the other
hand. But in some cases it is not clear if that distinction can be drawn: aer
all, discerning an act of trying, a coming to a decision or a bout of sadness are
not relevantly dierent from ascribing beliefs and desires as they all require
adopting an intentional stance.23
3.4 Self-knowledge
Dominic Murphy suggests that a transparency account along the lines of
Gareth Evans (1982) and Richard Moran (2001) would t better with my in-
terpretivist allegiance. I will rst briey outline the account presented in the
book and then I will comment on the approach suggested by Murphy.
In the book I was looking for an account of self-knowledge that would be
consistent with the general form of the ascription theory, and which would
do justice to the intuitive dierence between knowing one’s own mind and
the minds of others. is may seem challenging, for the canonical ascriba-
bility conditions are in their nature third-personal and give no special role
to considerations from the rst-person point of view. I began by pointing
out that it is part of common-sense psychology that people have authority
over their minds. More precisely, when one says that one has a certain men-
tal state, this is generally regarded as true. However, this folk psychological
presumption cannot stand on its own. One has to explain why it holds and
I reached out to subpersonal mechanisms for the required explanation. On
this view, rst-person authority is not a conceptual truth, but a contingent
principle that holds due to the way we are built. is is how we normally
function, where ‘normally’ is here understood in a statistical, not a strong
normative, sense.
In line with the ascription theory, the possession conditions for mental
states are constituted by their canonical ascriptions. Actual self-ascriptions
(or avowals or reports) of mental states are not automatically canonical sim-
23 McLaughlin andO’Leary-Hawthorne (1994, 209) regard the following dierence as crucial:
“It may be that types of belief-desire patterns are expressible only in an intentional vocab-
ulary. However, each of the types of patterns of dispositions to peripheral behavior that
get interpreted as belief-desire patterns can, in principle, be expressed in a nonintentional
vocabulary.” I think that this holds only when ‘dispositions to behaviour’ are understood in
the sense of dispositions to bare physical movements. However, this is not the sense of the
patterns on which the adoption of the intentional stance is needed to discern them.us,
in the context of the intentional stance theory, this particular dierence does not come up.
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ply on account of their being self-ascriptions, though normally they pass
the standard for canonicality.is is because of the subpersonal machinery
that maintains the congruence of one’s behaviour in a given environment,
generally speaking. A part of that congruence is the harmony between one’s
actions and one’s self-reports. Remember that the environment and the be-
haviour are also among the sources of the canonical ascription. It is then
no wonder that whenever a state is canonically ascribable, one’s subpersonal
machinery can produce the self-ascription of the same state, provided one
is appropriately prompted.
Although this view has some anity with reliabilism, the relevant sub-
personal machinery is understood quite broadly. ere is no commitment
to a single mechanism for self-knowledge, like on some inner sense views
that postulate a dedicated system for introspection. For this reason, my ac-
count is not inconsistent with interpretivism, which it would have been—as
Murphy rightly suggests—if it were committed to a mechanism that detects
or observes mental states as they pass through one’s mind.
Murphy does not really object to my account apart from when he notes
that the idea of a subpersonal mechanism triggering self-ascriptions remains
obscure. Perhaps the choice of that term was not entirely betting, indeed.
I meant to speak of the subpersonal processes that lead to a self-ascription.
Since the self-ascription under consideration is an actual act, not just the
possibility of the act, this act must be underpinned in each of its instances
by certain processes, and those in turn will be caused by certain ecacious
subpersonal processes (in line with the view on mental causation developed
inChapter 7).us, whenever one does actually self-ascribe amental state to
one, this act (ormore exactly, the process underpinning this act) is caused by
certainmechanisms in one’s brain. Being an interpretivist, I took some pains
to avoid the traditional view that it is either one’s unspecied experience,
or the mental state itself, that triggers the self-ascription (271–272). Since
that would invoke interpretation-independent mental entities, this option
is not available to an interpretivist. Another aspect that I wanted to convey
with the notion of triggering is that sometimes self-ascriptions can be caused
by internal subpersonal processes without any external prompts. Why this
happens is something for psychology to explain.
Let us now move on to the Evansian transparency account of self-
knowledge. Here the basic idea is that self-knowledge is a kind of delibera-
tion: to nd out if I believe that p I rely on the same procedures I usually em-
ploy in order to nd out if p is true.ese procedures are directed outwards
to the world, not to the inner stage of one’s mind, as the traditional picture
has it.ere is no dedicated mechanism for knowing one’s own mind. I just
make up my mind by nding out truths about the world. is account ap-
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plies in the rst instance to one’s knowledge of one’s current attitudes, and
Murphy (2017a, 44) suggests extending it to dispositional states with the help
of memory. In that case, one just recalls if one thinks that p is true: “I take a
content from memory storage—say in episodic or semantic memory—and
put it in working memory”.
e leanness of this approach is appealing indeed. However, I have some
scruples about it.ey are reservations about the account for the most part
from an interpretivist point of view. e issues I mention are however not
decisive objections.
First, I do not see it as “a better bet” for interpretivism like Murphy sug-
gests. It might not even be consistent with the view.e view relies crucially
on the cognitive processes for xing one’s world-directed attitudes: Mur-
phy (2017a, 44) writes about “the procedure for forming that belief or de-
sire”. is and his remarks on retrieving “content from memory storage”
sound very much in the spirit of a standard functionalist cognitive psychol-
ogy.ere seem to be ascription-independent cognitive processes operating
on stored memories, as well as on beliefs and desires as internal states. Be-
liefs andmemories participate in those processes qua beliefs andmemories,
not as subpersonal items, and operations on them are sensitive to their con-
tents. Both these cognitive processes as well as the memories and beliefs
with contents that these processes implicate seem to be independent from
the interpretation in this view. I am not saying that it is impossible to give
an ascriptivist gloss on such cognitive processes, but that does not appear to
be a part of Murphy’s model. On the face of it, the transparency account has
traded the inner mechanism for internal states.
Second, as presented, the account does not seem to yield a straightfor-
ward explanation for the authority of self-knowledge. Why assume that the
rst-person access to one’s mental states has authority over third-person ac-
cess? Is it because the others do not have access to my cognitive procedures?
But since the procedure is a world-directed means of deciding whether p
is the case, then they do not seem to be special in the way self-knowledge
seems special.ere is more promise for explaining authority in that man-
ner in the case of memory, for others normally cannot get into my memory
storage, but this does not help with the basic case.
ird, the range of application of the transparency account is prima fa-
cie restricted to one’s occurrent and remembered attitudes. is does not
include knowledge of one’s own emotions, sensations and bodily feelings,
to name just a few kinds of mental states apparently le out by the account
(cf. Coliva 2016, 123). What would be the outwards-looking or memory-
involving cognitive procedure for deliberating about whether one is in pain,
for instance? ere do not seem to be any simple tweaks in the ong to
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accommodate such states if one wants to keep the idea that self-knowledge
is an outwards-looking matter. To propose to follow whatever procedure
one follows in order to nd out if one is in pain would merely be to beg the
question. For that would presume an access to pain, but the nature of this
access is precisely what needs to be accounted for. Apart from this, if the
proposal is that in the case of pain I am somehow reaching inwards to the
pain itself to form the respective belief that I am in pain, then this solution is
not available for an interpretivist, who cannot help herself with such internal
and ascription-independent mental states.
However, I do not want to sound uncharitable here. In fact, I am in-
clined towards pluralism about self-knowledge; that is, I could admit that
since dierent kinds of mental states have dierent properties in our folk
psychology, they are also known in dierent ways.24 us an account of the
self-knowledge of beliefs need not be the same as the account of the self-
knowledge of bodily feelings. An interpretivist can adopt such dierent ac-
counts, provided that their commitments are consistent with interpretivism.
Accordingly, I do not want to preclude the possibility that, say, the deliber-
ative kind of self-knowledge can be explained along the lines of the trans-
parency account or better (as already hinted in 273–274), along the lines of
some amalgam of the ascriptionist and the transparency models.
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